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The past eight years have seen a decline in American soft or attractive power as the Bush 
Administration has employed hard power in Iraq as part its “global war on terrorism.” 
Some pundits believe that no matter who wins the 2008 election, he or she will be bound 
to follow the broad lines of Bush Administration’s strategy. Vice-President Richard Cheney 
has argued, “when we get all through 10 years from now, we’ll look back on this period of 
time and see that liberating 50 million people in Afghanistan and Iraq really did represent 
a major, fundamental shift, obviously, in U.S. policy in terms of how we dealt with the 
emerging terrorist threat – and that we’ll have fundamentally changed circumstances in 
that part of the world.”  President Bush himself has pointed out that Harry Truman 
suffered low ratings in the last year of his presidency because of the Korean War, but 
today is held in high regard and South Korea is a democracy protected by American 
troops. But this is an over-simplification of history. By this stage of his presidency, Truman 
had built major cooperative institutions such as the Marshall Plan and NATO.  
 
The crisis of September 11, 2001 produced an opportunity for George W. Bush to express 
a bold new vision of foreign policy, but one should judge a vision by whether it balances 
ideals with capabilities. Anyone can produce a wish list, but effective visions combine 
feasibility with the inspiration. Among past presidents, Franklin Roosevelt was good at 
this, but Woodrow Wilson was not. David Gergen has described the difference between 
the boldness of FDR and George W. Bush: “FDR  was also much more of a public 
educator than Bush, talking people carefully through the challenges and choices the 
nation faced, cultivating public opinion, building up a sturdy foundation of support before 
he acted. As he showed during the lead-up to World War II, he would never charge as far 
in front of his followers as Bush.” Bush’s temperament is less patient. As one journalist put 
it, “he likes to shake things up. That was the key to going into Iraq.” 
 
Contextual Intelligence 
The next president will need what I call “contextual intelligence” in my new book, The 
Powers to Lead.  In foreign policy, contextual intelligence is the intuitive diagnostic skill 
that helps you align tactics with objectives to create smart strategies in varying situations. 
Of recent presidents, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush had impressive contextual 
intelligence, but the younger Bush did not. It starts with a clear understanding of the 
current context of American foreign policy, both at home and abroad. 
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Academics, pundits, and advisors have often been mistaken about America’s position in 
the world. For example, two decades ago, the conventional wisdom was that the United 
States was in decline, suffering from “imperial overstretch”.  A decade later, with the end 
of the Cold War, the new conventional wisdom was that the world was a unipolar 
American hegemony. Some neo-conservative pundits drew the conclusion that the United 
States was so powerful that it could decide what it thought was right, and others would 
have no choice but to follow. Charles Krauthammer celebrated this view as “the new 
unilateralism” and it heavily influenced the Bush administration even before the shock of 
the attacks on September 11, 2001 produced a new “Bush Doctrine” of preventive war 
and coercive democratization. This new unilateralism was based on a profound 
misunderstanding of the nature of power in world politics.  Power is the ability to get the 
outcomes one wants. Whether the possession of resources will produce such outcomes 
depends upon the context. In the past, it was assumed that military power dominated 
most issues, but in today’s world, the contexts of power differ greatly on military, 
economic and transnational issues.  
 
Contextual intelligence must start with an understanding of the strength and limits of 
American power. We are the only superpower, but preponderance is not empire or 
hegemony. We can influence but not control other parts of the world. Power always 
depends upon context, and the context of world politics today is like a three dimensional 
chess game. The top board of military power is unipolar; but on the middle board of 
economic relations, the world is multipolar. On the bottom board of transnational relations 
(such as climate change, illegal drugs, pandemics, and terrorism) power is chaotically 
distributed. Military power is a small part of the solution in responding to these new 
threats. They require cooperation among governments and international institutions. Even 
on the top board (where America represents nearly half of world defense expenditures), 
our military is supreme in the global commons of air, sea, and space, but much more 
limited in its ability to control nationalistic populations in occupied areas.  
 
Second, the next president must understand the importance of developing an integrated 
grand strategy that combines hard military power with soft attractive power. In the struggle 
against terrorism, we need to use hard power against the hard core terrorists, but we 
cannot hope to win unless we gain the hearts and minds of the moderates. If the mis-use 
of hard power (such as in Abu Ghraib or Guantanamo) creates more new terrorist recruits 
than we kill or deter, we will lose. Right now we have no integrated strategy for combining 
hard and soft power. Many official instruments of soft power – public diplomacy, 
broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military to 
military contacts – are scattered around the government and there is no overarching 
strategy or budget that even tries to integrate them with hard power into an overarching 
national security strategy. We spend about 500 times more on the military than we do on 
broadcasting and exchanges. Is this the right proportion? How would we know? How 
would we make trade-offs? And how should the government relate to the non-official 
generators of soft power – everything from Hollywood to Harvard to the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation -- that emanate from our civil society? 
 
A third aspect of contextual intelligence for the next president will be recognition of the 
growing importance of Asia. Bush’s theme of a “war on terrorism” has led to an excessive 
focus on one region, the Middle East. We have not spent enough attention on Asia. In 
1800, Asia had three fifths of the world population and three fifths of the world’s product. 
By 1900, after the industrial revolution in Europe and America, Asia’s share shrank to 
one-fifth of the world product. By 2020, Asia will be well on its way back to its historical 
share. The “rise” in the power of China and India may create instability, but it is a problem 








outcome. A century ago, Britain managed the rise of American power without conflict, but 
the world’s failure to manage the rise of German power led to two devastating world wars. 
In this regard, the enormous success of South Korea both in economic and democratic 
terms offers a promising prospect for Asia’s future. It will be important to integrate Asian 
countries into an international institutional structure where they can become responsible 
stakeholders.  
 
Soft and Hard Power 
The Bush Administration has drawn analogies between the war on terrorism and the Cold 
War. The president is correct that this will be a long struggle. Most outbreaks of 
transnational terrorism in the past century took a generation to burn out. But another 
aspect of the analogy has been neglected. We won the Cold War by a smart combination 
of our hard coercive power and the soft attractive power of our ideas. When the Berlin 
Wall finally collapsed, it was not destroyed by an artillery barrage, but by hammers and 
bulldozers wielded by those who had lost faith in communism.  
 
There is very little likelihood that we can ever attract people like Osama bin Laden: we 
need hard power to deal with such cases. But we cannot win if the number of people the 
extremists are recruiting is larger than the number we are killing and deterring or 
convincing to choose moderation over extremism. The Bush administration is beginning to 
understand this general proposition, but it does not seem to know how to implement such 
a strategy. To achieve this – to thwart our enemies, but also to reduce their numbers 
through deterrence, suasion and attraction -- we need better strategy.  
 
In the information age, success is not merely the result of whose army wins, but also 
whose story wins. The current struggle against extremist jihadi terrorism is not a clash of 
civilizations, but a civil war within Islam. We can not win unless the Muslim mainstream 
wins. While we need hard power to battle the extremists, we need the soft power of 
attraction to win the hearts and minds of the majority. Polls throughout the Muslim world 
show that we are not winning this battle, and that it is our policies not our values that 
offend. Presidential rhetoric about promoting democracy is less convincing than pictures 
of Abu Ghraib.  
 
Despite these failures, there has been little political debate about the squandering of 
American soft power. Soft power is an analytical term, not a political slogan and perhaps 
that is why, not surprisingly, it has taken hold in academic analysis, and in other places 
like Europe, China and India, but not in the American political debate. Especially in the 
current political climate, it makes a poor slogan  -- post 9/11 emotions left little room for 
anything described as “soft.” We may need soft power as a nation, but it is a difficult 
political sell for politicians.  Bill Clinton captured the mindset of the American people when 
he said that in a climate of fear, the electorate would choose “strong and wrong” over 
“timid and right.” The good news from the 2006 Congressional election is that the 
pendulum may be swinging back to the middle. 
 
 Of course soft power is not the solution to all problems. Even though North Korean 
dictator Kim Jong Il likes to watch Hollywood movies, that is unlikely to affect his nuclear 
weapons program. And soft power got nowhere in attracting the Taliban government away 
from its support for Al Qaeda in the 1990s. It took hard military power to end that.  But 
other goals such as the promotion of democracy and human rights are better achieved by 












The United States needs to rediscover how to be a “smart power.” That was the 
conclusion of a bipartisan commission that I recently co-chaired with Richard Armitage, 
the former deputy secretary of state in the Bush administration. A group of Republican 
and Democratic members of Congress, former ambassadors, retired military officers and 
heads of non-profit organization was convened by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington. We concluded that America’s image and influence 
had declined in recent years, and that the United States had to move from exporting fear 
to inspiring optimism and hope.  
 
The Smart Power Commission is not alone in this conclusion. Recently Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates called for the U.S. government to commit more money and effort to soft 
power tools including diplomacy, economic assistance and communications because the 
military alone cannot defend America’s interests around the world. He pointed out that 
military spending totals nearly half a trillion dollars annually compared with a State 
Department budget of $36 billion. In his words, “I am here to make the case for 
strengthening our capacity to use soft power and for better integrating it with hard power.” 
He acknowledged that for the head of the Pentagon to plead for more resources for the 
State Department was as odd as a man biting a dog, but these are not normal times. 
 
Smart power is the ability to combine the hard power of coercion or payment with the soft 
power of attraction into a successful strategy. By and large, the United States managed 
such a combination during the Cold War, but more recently U.S. foreign policy has tended 
to over-rely on hard power because it is the most direct and visible source of American 
strength. The Pentagon is the best trained and best resourced arm of the government, but 
there are limits to what hard power can achieve on its own. Promoting democracy, human 
rights and development of civil society are not best handled with the barrel of a gun. It is 
true that the American military has an impressive operational capacity, but the practice of 
turning to the Pentagon because it can get things done leads to an image of an over-
militarized foreign policy.  
 
Diplomacy and foreign assistance are often under-funded and neglected, in part because 
of the difficulty of demonstrating their short term impact on critical challenges. In addition, 
wielding soft power is difficult because many of America’s soft power resources lie outside 
of government in the private sector and civil society, in its bilateral alliances, multilateral 
institutions, and transnational contacts. Moreover, American foreign policy institutions and 
personnel are fractured and compartmentalized and there is not an adequate inter-agency 
process for developing and funding a smart power strategy.  
 
The effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks have also thrown us off course. Since the shock of  
9/11, the United States has been exporting fear and anger rather than our more traditional 
values of hope and optimism. Guantanamo has become a more powerful global icon than 
the Statue of Liberty. The CSIS Smart Power Commission acknowledged that terrorism is 
a real threat and likely to be with us for decades, but we pointed out that over-responding 
to the provocations of extremists does us more damage than the terrorists ever could. The 
commission argued  that success in the struggle against terrorism means finding a new 
central premise for American foreign policy to replace the current theme of a “war on 
terror.” A commitment to providing for the global good can provide that premise. 
  
The United States should become a smart power by once again investing in the global 
public goods – providing things people and governments in all quarters of the world want 
but cannot attain the absence of leadership by the largest country. By complementing 








focusing on global public goods, the United States can rebuild the framework that it needs 
to tackle tough global challenges.  
  
Specifically, the Smart Power Commission recommended that American foreign policy 
should focus on five critical areas:  
 
• We should restore our alliances, partnerships and multilateral institutions. Many 
have fallen in disarray in recent years of unilateral approaches and a renewed 
investment in institutions will be essential. 
 
• Global development should be a high priority. Elevating the role of development in 
U.S. foreign policy can help align our interests with that of people around the 
world. A major initiative on global public health would be a good place to start. 
 
• We should invest in a public diplomacy that builds less on broadcasting and 
invests more in face to face contacts, education, and exchanges that involve civil 
society. A new foundation for international understanding could focus on young 
people. 
 
• Economic integration. Resisting protectionism and continuing engagement in the 
global economy is necessary for growth and prosperity not only at home but also 
for peoples abroad. Maintaining an open international economy, however, will 
require attention to inclusion of those that market changes leave behind both at 
home and abroad. 
 
• Energy security and climate change are global goods where we have failed to take 
the lead but that will be increasingly important on the agenda of world politics in 
coming years. A new American foreign policy should help shape a global 
consensus and develop innovative technologies will be crucial in meeting  this 
important set of challenges .  
 
Implementing such a smart power strategy will require a strategic reassessment of 
how the U.S. government is organized, coordinated, and budgeted. The next 
president should consider a number of creative solutions to maximize the 
administrations ability to organize for success, including the appointment of senior 
personnel who could reach across agencies to better align resources into a smart 
power strategy. This will require innovation. 
 
Leadership matters in foreign policy. States follow their national interests, but different 
leaders help to define national interests in different ways. For a powerful state such as 
the US, the structure of world politics allows degrees of freedom in such definitions. It 
may be true that the most powerful state is like the biggest kid on the block who will 
always engender a degree of jealousy and resentment, but it matters whether the big 
kid acts like a bully or a helpful friend. Both substance and style matter.  If the most 
powerful actor is seen as producing global public goods, it is more likely to develop 
legitimacy and soft power.  
 
Style also matters, even when public goods are the issue. For example, the Chair of 
the White House Council on Environmental Quality told the 2007 UN conference on 
climate change at Bali, “The U.S. will lead, and we will continue to lead, but leadership 
requires others to fall into line and follow.” That statement became a sore point to 








power. This is something that the United States is rediscovering after its infatuation 
with the “unipolar moment and the new unilateralism.” The next administration, of 
whichever party, will have to learn better how to generate soft power, and relate it to 
hard power in smart strategies. This will require leaders with contextual intelligence. 
The bad news is that they will inherit a difficult international environment. The good 
news is that previous presidents have managed to employ hard, soft and smart power 
in equally difficult contexts. If it has happened before, perhaps it can happen again.   
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